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Big concern
• Growth of labor-replacing robots will lead to even more inequality and 
unemployment
• Machines have long been stronger than humans, better able to do many 
physical jobs
• Computers are better at processing large amounts of information
• AI means that robots may even be better at learning
• Extent to which they can replace or outperform humans in immediate 
future uncertain—large variance in estimates
• Alternative perspective:  robots (AI) will be labor augmenting, increasing 
productivities of large proportion of population
• This paper sets problem in more abstract analysis of consequences of 
economy wide labor replacing robots
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Technological possibilities and utility
Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
1) If (i) the world is 1st-best and (ii) redistribution is costless,
the utility possibilities frontier (UPF) moves out (even if 
competitive equilibrium wage decreases):






















Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
2) If (i) the world is 1st-best but (ii) redistribution is limited, the 
constrained utility possibilities frontier (UPF) may not lie 
outside the original schedule:
 Limiting technological change may be desirable for workers
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Technological possibilities and utility
More generally: the 1st-best UPF is the outer envelope of all possible 
constrained UPFs, which reflect all possible institutional regimes, e.g.:
• explicit redistribution systems
• intellectual property regimes
• market arrangements (e.g. market power)
• social norms (e.g. about charity or social equity)
 changing any of these institutions may improve
workers’ welfare
 If redistributions limited, may have to rely more on other institutional 
changes
 Limits on IP limit rents that accrue to innovators; may also limit pace of 
innovation
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Technological possibilities and utility
Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
3) If the world is not 1st-best, the utility possibilities frontier may 
move inwards (even with costless distribution):













Incentives for Innovation and Welfare
No 1st welfare theorem for innovation
4) Privately optimal innovation may shift the utility possibilities frontier 
inward (even with costless redistribution)
 Intervening in the innovation process may generate Pareto 
improvements
(Examples: high-frequency trading; markets focusing on unskilled labor 
replacing innovation, even when shadow price of labor is low, ignoring 
importance of carbon innovation)
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Critical question: public policy
• Are there public policies which would ensure that everyone 
would be better off?
• Political economy:  will these policies emerge out of our 
political processes?
The remainder of this lecture focuses on first question.  
Constructs two simple models analyzing: 
(a) What happens when machines replace workers?  
(b) What are l.r. consequences of different policies?
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Worker-Replacing Technological Change
Q = F(K, H + M) … constant returns to scale
where Q is output, K is capital, H is human labor, and 




1) What does worker-replacing technological change do to 
wages?
2) What can public policy do about it? 9
Machine Labor and Factor Earnings
Proposition 1: Machine Labor and Factor Earnings (short-run, before other factors 
adjust): adding a marginal unit of machine labor reduces human wages but increases 
returns of complementary factors in a zero-sum manner
Euler’s Theorem:  𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 � + 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 � = 𝐹𝐹 𝐾𝐾,𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀
Additional unit of M:        𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿 = 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿
or simplified:                           𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
+ 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝐾𝐾
= 0
 adding machine labor creates redistribution toward complementary factors
= pecuniary externality
 increased returns for complementary factor owners are like unearned rents
10
Machine Labor and Factor Earnings
Proposition 1 holds for all factors in the production function, e.g.:
• Labor vs capital
• Labor vs land
• Unskilled labor (replaced by machines) vs skilled labor
• Labor vs Entrepreneurial rents
 policy can undo the redistribution by taxing unearned rents
 taxes on previously accumulated factors are non-distortionary 
(they automatically identify out-of-equilibrium returns)
at the margin, Pareto-improvement
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Panglossian world: singularity
Labor is most important factor of production
 scarcity of labor = biggest constraint on output
machine labor makes this factor easily reproducible 
Proposition 2: Machine Labor and Singularity: if machine labor is 
sufficiently cheap and all other factors are also reproducible, the 
economy experiences a singularity, leading to:
• exponential growth driven by factor accumulation (AK-style)
• unchanged level of wages, but human labor share  0
 outcome benign if workers care about absolute level of labor 
earnings 12
The Return of Scarcity
Although singularity may lead to significant growth, it is likely it will eventually be 
limited by scarcity of other non-reproducible factors,
e.g. land or energy
Proposition 3: Machine Labor and Return of Scarcity: if there are non-reproducible 
factors, they will eventually limit growth 
• human wages fall; owners of non-reproducible factors absorb all the rents
• at the margin, redistribution from workers to non-reproducible factor owners is 
zero sum
• taxes on non-reproducible factors are by definition non-distortionary
scope for non-distortionary redistribution; at the margin Pareto improvement
Technological change gives rise to rents which can be taxed, and revenues used 
to compensate workers 13
Intellectual Property Rights and 
Redistribution
If outright redistribution is infeasible, intervention to steer 
technological progress may act as a 2nd-best device
Example: assume we have a distortionary tax τ leading to capital 
K(τ) and machine labor M(z) is function of patent life z.
Q = F(K(τ), M(z) + H)
Where H is number of workers
Government maximizes W w.r.t. τ and z ≥ z*, M(z*) = 0, where W 
is social welfare
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Maximizing well-being of 
workers
Define τ^ (M) as value of tax, redistributed to workers, which 
keeps workers just as well off.  Representative worker income I is 
given by
I = w + τ^ K(τ)/H
Where w = FL :  workers’ receive marginal product
Machines decrease marginal product (compete with humans).  
Hence, as M increases, τ must increase.  But increase in τ
decreases capital stock, and that hurts workers.  
Proposition 4.  So long as the  elasticity of capital supply is not 
too large, we can always increase τ and compensate workers
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Reframing the issue
• Assume a growth rate g(z, τ), function of the length of the patent and tax rate, 
assume b(z, τ) fraction of output that can be appropriated by innovator, then 
p.d.v. of income of workers approximately given by
Y* =  (1 – b (1 – τ))(1 – c(g)/ 1 + g – δ
If we choose {z, τ} to maximize Y*, in general, the optimum will not be a corner 
solution in which innovation necessarily hurts workers
We can extend that to include capital, skilled and unskilled workers.
Implication: 
Proposition 5 in general, the optimal {z*, τ *} entails g > 0.
i.e. t.c. can improve well-being of workers, but pace of t.c. that maximizes workers 
likely to be well below maximal feasible pace, or even pace which maximizes well-
being of innovators 16
How to help ensure evolution of technology is 
likely to be welfare increasing
• Economy will be evolving towards service sector economy
• Among key service sectors are education, health, and other public services
• Value of those services is largely socially determined—not “just” a market process
• If we value those services highly—pay good wages, provide good working conditions, and 
create sufficient number of jobs—that will limit growth in market income inequality
• Including jobs with limited skill requirements
• Higher pay will result in such jobs having higher “respect”
• Private sector wages will follow public sector wages
• May need also to provide wage subsidy for low wage jobs, to encourage demand for such jobs 
and increase wages
• If elasticity of entrepreneurial services is low, we can impose high taxes to finance these 
jobs
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• Under these conditions, benefits of growth can be shared 
equitably, and in ways that ensure full employment
• Larger pie—so everyone can be better off
• Such an outcome is economically feasible
• But economy may not go in that direction
• Politics matters
• And even the conditions for economic feasibility are restrictive
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Endogenous factor bias
• If endogenously determined bias of technological change 
works as it should, as wages get low, focus is on capital and 
resource augmenting technical change
• Limiting decline in share of labor (in stable equilibrium) and in 
inequality
• (Can describe dynamics with standard wage-setting mechanism:  




• Transition may not be easy
• Markets on their own are not good at structural transformation
• Great Depression can be viewed as being caused by rapid pace of 
innovation in agriculture
• Fewer workers needed
• Resulting in marked decline in agriculture income
• Leading to decline in demand for urban products
• Latter effect was so large that long standing migration patterns were reversed
• What might have been a Pareto improvement turned out to be immiserizing
technological change, as both those in the urban and rural sector suffered
• General result:  (a)  with mobility frictions and rigidities technological 
change can be welfare decreasing 
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Government intervention in transition enabled 
the successful structural transformation
• By-product of World War II
• It was not only a Keynesian stimulus
• But facilitated move from rural to urban and the retraining of 
the labor force
• A successful industrial policy
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Disequilibrium impacts on inequality
• Technological change has large distributive effects
• Destruction of value of physical and human capital
• Only if the individual could obtain perfect insurance at the time of birth 
(or before the conception of the innovation) would information about 
the advent of the job replacing innovation, and the advent itself, not be 
welfare reducing.  
• But someone born as an unskilled worker today, even under these 
conditions where he could buy insurance, will be worse off than he 
would have been had there not been such a possibility—unless the 
government engages in ex ante lump sum redistributions to compensate 
the individuals for the decrease in ex ante expected utility. 22
Clear parallels to situation today
Economy could be caught in a low level equilibrium trap
Government can play an important role in increasing welfare, in some cases, a Pareto improvement, 
in others reducing inequality, improving the plight of workers
Policies to facilitate transition and ensure a welfare enhancing long run equilibrium include:
• Policies to increase wages of even low skilled jobs
• High aggregate demand—to ensure low unemployment rate
• Wage subsidy
• Minimum wage—also would (together with other measures) help encourage innovations that 
increase productivity of labor at the bottom
• High wages in public sector—to help drive up wages in economy more generally
• Other policies to encourage attractiveness of such jobs and increase respect for them
• Vastly expanded Earned income tax credit—to ensure that no one who works full time is in 
poverty
• Does it make a difference whether individuals or jobs are subsidized?  
• High carbon tax—to encourage resource saving innovation, at the expense of labor saving 
innovation
• Would simultaneously address two of most serious global problems
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Further policies
• Elimination of tax deduction for interest and the imposition of a tax 
on capital—to induce more capital augmenting innovation
• “Wage share” tax:  profit tax increased if wage share (appropriately 
defined) is lower
• Narrowing breadth and duration of patents
• And circumscribing use of patents to create monopolies
• More reliance on public research
• With government appropriating returns
• Directing research towards resource saving innovation and away 
from labor using innovation
• More effective anti-trust laws, more effectively enforced
• An increase in labor-demand increasing public investments
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UBI not solution
• Human jobs provide not only income but also mental services 
in the form of meaning, status, and fulfillment
• If this is so, shift from focusing on pure redistribution of 
income to generation of jobs or other activities
• But this could be just a characteristic of current generation
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Relationship between Technological 
Progress and Globalization
• Globalization can be viewed as a change in technology—expanding 
production possibilities
• Ideas presented here apply:
• In standard neoclassical model, new equilibrium entails unskilled workers worse off 
in advanced countries (factor price equalization theorem, illustrated by figure 1)
• Weakening of workers’ bargaining power moves new equilibrium to an even more 
disadvantageous position
• Argument that redistribution is costly implies we are in regime illustrated by figure 
2—workers objecting to trade liberalization understandable
• With imperfect risk and capital markets and frictions free trade may be Pareto 
inferior (Newbery Stiglitz 1984, Stiglitz 2017) (Figure 3)
• Especially relevant for recent trade agreements:  effect of TPP on GDP negligible, but it 
may still have had distributive effects
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Malthusian perspective on the 
proliferation of artificial intelligence
• If basic human intelligence is made redundant and the marginal 
product of human labor would fall below the human subsistence 
level, if redistribution is deemed infeasible, society faces two 
unpleasant alternatives:  
• halting AI or 
• allowing Malthusian forces to play out.  




• Worker-replacing technological change can be unambiguously 
positive in a 1st-best economy, or if it is coupled with the right 
form of redistribution that undoes pecuniary externalities that 
arise in response to rapid innovation in the economy.  
• In the absence of such intervention, there is a presumption that 
worker-replacing technological change will not only lead to workers 
getting a diminishing share of national income, but actually being 
worse off.
• The scope for redistribution is facilitated by the fact that the 
changes in factor prices create windfall gains on the 
complementary factors and that should make it rather easy to 
achieve Pareto improvements. 
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Concluding remarks
• The more willing society is to support the necessary transition 
and to provide support to those who are “left behind,” the 
faster the pace of innovation that society can accommodate, 
and still ensure that the outcomes are Pareto improvements
• A society that is not willing to engage in such actions should 
expect resistance to innovation, with uncertain political and 
economic consequences.  
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